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IN-FLIGHT ICING AND HOW AIRLINES ARE COPING 
Wayne L. Golding 
I 
ABSTRACT 
The hazards posed by in-flight icing are an important issue in commercial aviation. Extensive research into 
methods for coping with in-flight icing has been continuing for many years. This paper addresses the issues 
pertaining to in-flight icing including causes, impact on commercial aviation, and initiatives undertaken to 
avoid in-flight icing mishaps today and in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
"During 20 minutes of cruise flying in icing 
conditions, the airplane's speed decreased from about 200 
knots to 158 knots. Just three seconds after the captain 
uttered 'severe icing,' the airplane's stall protection system 
activated. The radar track of its flight showed the airplane 
falling with the dead weight of a brick at a rate of more than 
22,000 feet per minute. The circumstances are similar to 
those of other events involving various airplane types in 
cruise, hold, climb or even descent7'(Dow, 2003, p.1). The 
crash of TranAsia Airways Flight GE791 is under 
investigation by the Aviation Safety Council (ASC) of 
Taiwan. Recently, the ASC issued a bulletin calling upon 
French manufacturer Avions de Transport Regional (ATR), 
and on regulatory authorities in Taiwan, France and Canada 
to emphasize training in crew awareness of icing conditions 
(Dow, 2003). 
The pilots commented they were in severe icing 73 
seconds before the abrupt end of the cockpit voice 
recording. The progression from concern to genuine alarm 
is all too familiar. They might have recovered with a descent 
to warmer levels. Not to go for a rapid descent is to invite 
the classic stall, "roll upset" and spin. Once the airplane 
starts to auto-rotate into a spin, recovery under the 
disorienting conditions at night-as in this case-would have 
been difficult. If crews miss the insidious rearward motion 
of the elevator trim wheel (or indicator) as speed bleeds off 
and angle-of-attack increases to compensate for increased 
drag, maybe yet another warning system is in order (Dow, 
2003). 
John Dow, a recently retired Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) expert on in-flight icing, said he 
could wallpaper a room with digital flight data recorder 
tracings of icing incidents and accidents that look like this 
crash, based on the details at this early stage in the 
postmortem-the steady erosion of speed, the increase in 
nose-up trim by the autopilot, perhaps the final addition of 
power, and the wrenching roll and departure from controlled 
flight (Dow, 2003). 
Dow has described the nature of icing as one where 
the insidious trap is set when stall speed increases from ice 
buildup on the wing, and then the trap is sprung on a 
surprised crew. With insufficient available thrust, the crew 
would be unable to accelerate while remaining in level flight 
and so would need to unload the airplane by applying nose- 
down elevator. This method of escape increases airspeed 
and reduces angle-of-attack away from the deadly stalling 
angle--where lateral control easily can be lost (Dow, 2003). 
Where to Expect Icing 
Winter weather patterns provide all the right ingredients 
to produce major problems with icing. Icing can occur in 
both stratiform and cumuliform clouds, but in winter, it's 
more likely to be encountered in solid overcast, stratiform 
clouds, spread over hundreds of miles. Cumuliform clouds, 
in contrast, can produce more intense icing, but the icing 
conditions are relatively isolated, especially in winter. 
Notably, cumuliform buildups, embedded in warm front 
stratus clouds, can cause serious icing (George, 2003). 
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Icing typically occurs on the northern side of storm tracks 
that often ride winter jet streams, according to Ben 
Bernstein, senior research meteorologist at the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colo. The 
northern jet over the United States tends to hug the Canadian 
border in the autumn, and then migrates south toward Texas + 
and Tennessee during winter months, Bernstein explained. 
Icing also can be expected on the northern, or colder, side of 
surface lows, especially in areas of widespread clouds 
(George, 2003). 
Icing occurs only if atmospheric moisture is "super 
cooled," or cooled below freezing while remaining in liquid 
state. When the liquid impinges upon a surface, it freezes, 
thereby creating icing. The heaviest icing usually occurs 
between -lOC and OC, accumulating as clear icing. It's 
especially insidious because accretion is hard to see, 
particularly at night. Relatively warm temperatures also are 
conducive to formation of larger-diameter water droplets. 
Larger droplets can rapidly fonn ice horns or ridges on 
airfoil leading edges that can distort airflow. Any ice 
buildup on an airfoil increases drag and stall speed (George, 
2003). 
At colder temperatures, rime ice is more likely to form, 
appearing similar to frost buildup in an old freezer. Rime ice 
is typically encountered at temperatures between -20C 
and -10C. It usually doesn't build up as fast as clear ice 
because clouds typically have less liquid water content and 
smaller droplets at colder temperatures. Below -20C, for 
instance, the probability of encountering ice drops steeply, 
although icing has been known to occur at temperatures as 
cold as -40C. Below that temperature, all the moisture 
within the cloud 6-eezes, thereby eliminating the potential 
for icing. Types of aircraft icing are summarized in table 1 
(George, 2003). 
Table 1. Summary of types of aircraft icing 
Any weather phenomena producing gradual lift can 
generate super-cooled water droplets if sufficient moisture 
is present. But if the lift is too gentle, then only clouds 
develop. If the lift is too rapid, large droplets tend to form, 
falling as rain or hail. Sometimes, the droplets will fall as 
freezing rain or drizzle below the cloud, an especially 
formidable type of icing hazard. Surface weather 
observations or forecasts of freezing rain or drizzle, or ice 
pellets, indicate a high probability of encountering 
significant, if not extreme, icing in the skies or clouds above 
(George, 2003). 
Effects of Ice 
Ice in-flight is always bad news. It destroys the 
smooth flow of air, increasing drag while decreasing the 
ability of the airfoil to lift. The actual weight of the ice on 
the airplane is secondary to the airflow disruption it causes. 
As power is added to compensate for the additional drag and 
the nose is lifted to maintain altitude, the angle of attack is 
increased, allowing the undersides of the wings and fuselage 
to accumulate ice. Ice accumulates on every exposed part of 
the airplane--not just on the wings, propeller, and 
windscreen, but also on the antennas, vents, intakes, and 
cowlings. It builds in flight where no heat, boots, or deicing 
fluid can reach it. It can cause antennas to vibrate so 
severely that they break. In moderate to severe conditions, 
smaller aircraft can become so iced up that continued flight 
is impossible. The airplane may stall at much higher speeds 
and lower angles of attack than normal. It can roll or pitch 
uncontrollably, and recovery may be impossible (Brown, 
1999). 
In order to provide a standard for reporting and 
describing icing, the aviation community has classified icing 
into intensities according to the rate of accumulation. 
Categories of icing are summarized in table 2 (Dow, 1999). 
Icing Type 
Clear 
. Rime 
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Table 2. Summary of categories of icing 
Impact of Icing on Commercial Aviation 
According to recent FAA surveys, aircraft crashes 
due to icing claim about 30 lives, injure 14 others, and result 
in $96 million in property damage annually in the United 
States (McGehan, 2002). Cancellations and delays due to icy 
weather can cost airlines millions of dollars in a single day. 
On March 20,2000, icing conditions at Denver International 
Airport forced Air Wisconsin to cancel 152 flights. United 
cancelled 159 outbound and 140 inbound flights the same 
day, mostly because of weather ("Airlines Get New Tools to 
Avoid In-Flight Icing," 2002). 
As David Hinson, then FAA administrator, 
explained the agency's position: "Technology has not 
advanced to the point of providing a reliable means to assess 
in-flight icing conditions with that degree of accuracy or 
specificityn(Cole, 1997, B 1). By contrast, the National 
Transportation Safety Board had urged the FAA to require 
installation of new equipment that can "positively 
determine" when airplanes are in hazardous icing conditions 
(Cole, 1997). 
Manufacturers and some pilots also have called for 
such upgrades. James Bettcher, a pilot for Delta Air Lines 
who serves on the Air Line Pilots Association's special icing 
study team, says that ice remains a serious hazard. "If 
everyone who flies knew how bad the situation really is, they 
wouldn't stand for it," he says (Cole, 1997, p. 1). 
PREVENTING ICING-RELATED MISHAPS 
Pilot Training 
The coefficient of lift for a clean wing might be 
1.60. But with ice contamination it can drop 40% or more to 
0.9. As a consequence, stall speed can increase from 110 
knots, in this case, to 140 knots. The airplane may give no 
warning to the pilot of the new, higher stall speed. At 130 
knots or less in this hypothetical example, there is adequate 
power to overcome drag. But with the contaminated stall 
speed of 140 knots, the airplane loses lift before speed 
decreases to 130 knots. Additionally, ice contamination can 
cause propeller efficiency to degrade 15% or more. The 
Icing Category 
Trace 
Light 
Moderate 
Severe 
pilot does not have the power to accelerate t o  a higher 
speed or maintain altitude. The result is the airplane must 
descend. The question is whether it will descend under the 
control of the pilot or Mother Nature (Dow, 2003). 
The following is a simple warning system for 
severe icing. At top of the climb, set the airspeed on cruise 
speed. When the speed drops 20 knots below that, a warbler 
sounds and the pilots are either in a steep turn with power 
set or experiencing the onset of severe icing. The 20-kt band 
accommodates a speed variance that might be seen in the 
turn as a turboprop executes the reversals of direction in a 
lightly iced holding pattern. Dozens of roll upset events 
show that pilots are maintaining or attempting to increase 
pitch attitude while applying power. This has resulted in 
failure to recover fiom the stall and protracted roll 
oscillations with altitude loss in excess of 3,000 feet with 
several accidents resulting in altitude losses in excess of 
10,000 feet (Dow, 2003). 
Pilots are being trained to recover using this 
technique at first sign of stall, usually stick shaker in lieu of 
reducing angle of attack by pitch attitude change or flap 
extension if ground contact is imminent or airplane pitch 
response is degraded. Stall protection systems may not have 
sufficient margin to protect against contaminated stall so that 
the stick shaker does not fire or fires at stall onset, instead of 
activating in the approach to stall. Insufficient thrust is 
available to accelerate airplane out of stall, so stall upset is 
protracted and total loss of control may occur (Dow, 2003). 
Pilots do not experience this type of event in 
training and are not trained to recover. Very few regional 
turboprop operators have simulators, which can realistically 
present these events for pilot training. At first sign of a stall, 
which may be stick shaker, uncommanded roll, buffet or 
other aerodynamic cues, apply nose down pitch control and 
level the wings while advancing RPM and torque until 
sufficient increase in airspeed for type. If unable to lower 
nose, extend flaps fiom the cruise configuration. Recover, 
maintaining higher airspeed than at upset. Retract flaps if 
Rate of Accumulation 
Slightly greater than the rate of sublimation 
May require occasional use of ice protection systems to remove 
Frequent use of ice protection systems is necessary 
Ice protection systems fail to remove the accumulation of ice 
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extended for the recovery (Dow, 2003). 
The NTSB recently identified its 2003 "Most 
Wanted" aviation safety recommendations, and airframe 
structural icing was also included on this year's most 
wanted. The board had described the FAA's icing 
certification process as "inadequate, and the FAA had not 
adopted a systematic and reactive approach to the 
certification and operational issues of turboprop-driven 
airplane icing."(Fiorino, 2003) 
Aviation Directive 97-20- 14 currently requires 
incorporating information into the Airplane Flight Manual 
that would mandate pilot training before flight into known 
or forecast icing conditions after a certain date. AD 97-20- 
14 was the result of the FAA's analysis that the training 
level of the pilots of the MU-2B series airplanes made it 
difficult for pilots to recognize adverse operating conditions 
and operate safely while flying in icing conditions. Since 
issuance of AD 97-20-14, a new training video has been 
developed that includes information that is critical to safety 
of the MU-2B series airplanes. This proposed AD would 
require this new video as the mandatory pilot training. The 
actions specified by this AD are intended to decrease the 
chance of icing-related incidents or accidents of the MU-2B 
series airplanes due to pilot error. FAA estimates that this 
proposed AD affects 300 airplanes on the U. S. Registry. 
The pilot can view the training video in eight hours 
(Airworthiness Directives, 2003). 
The aviation simulation and training business is 
expanding. In addition, the FAA is proposing sweeping 
changes that will affect the simulation industry. Innovative 
techniques and procedures are evolving to train pilots of 
general aviation and air transport aircraft that take advantage 
of the increased simulation capabilities available. As part of 
the process, the FAA's Flight Standards Division officials 
are meeting with simulator manufacturers and end users to 
learn more about new technologies. For example, one area 
under discussion is icing (Phillips, 2002) 
FAA Aviation Weather Research Proeram 
Since 2002, airlines have a new tool for avoiding 
in-flight icing, which can threaten smaller commuter planes 
and delay larger commercial aircraft as they land or take off. 
Current Icing Potential (CIP) is an online display that offers 
high-precision maps and plots, updated hourly, to identify 
areas of potential aircraft icing produced by cloud drops, 
freezing rain, and drizzle. Researchers at the National Center 
for Atmospheric Research, with h d i n g  from the FAA, 
developed new methods and software for detecting and 
forecasting icing potential in the atmosphere. They then 
applied these methods to produce CIP, a web-based display 
describing current icing conditions. CIP is for use by 
meteorologists and airline dispatchers. Its use by pilots and 
air traffic controllers is pending FAA approval. A 
companion tool, called FIP (Forecast Icing Potential), which 
forecasts potential icing up to 12 hours ahead, is still in 
development at NCAR and classified as experimental by the 
FAA (Airlines Get New Tools to Avoid In-Flight Icing, 
2002). 
NASA Research Program (Tntelligent Flight Control 
Svstem) 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) researchers are flying the first set of tests aimed at 
creating "smart" flight control software they hope will 
someday allow battle-damaged military jets.and commercial 
jetliners with severe icing to land safely. Researchers at the 
NASA Dryden Flight Research Center have started a series 
of six to 10 flight tests of the Intelligent Flight Control 
System (IFSC). The tests are in support of a NASA effort to 
develop neural "network" software that would discover 
patterns in the data it receives and modify its behavior 
accordingly (Skeen, 2002). 
The goal is to develop software that would sense 
when an aircraft is damaged and then automatically 
manipulate control surfaces -- like flaps, rudders or ailerons 
-- to compensate, restoring control to the pilot. The first set 
of flight tests involve a "nonlearning" preliminary version of 
the neural network software that is pre-trained to the 
aerodynamic database of the research aircratl, a highly 
modified F-15B fighter. The first of three objectives is to 
make sure that the nonlearning parts of the system are 
hctioning correctly. These tests will look at the stability 
and control of the aircraft. The test aircraft will have two 
flight control systems: its regular system to bring the aircraft 
up to test altitudes and speeds, and the test s o h a r e  (Skeen, 
2002). "We are going to attempt to determine the best 
maneuvers for online parameter identification -- the 
aerodynamic data, stability and control, and handling 
qualities," John Bosworth, the project's chief engineer, said 
of the second objective. "In addition, for the third objective, 
we will be performing handling qualities studies with the 
nonlearning system for comparison to the learning system in 
order to get more baseline data to compare with simulation 
and aerodynamic models" (Skeen, 2002, p. 3). 
Neural network software is distinguished by its 
ability to observe patterns in the data it receives and 
processes and then performs different tasks in response to 
new patterns. NASA estimates it will spend about $10 
Page 36 JAAER, Spring 2004 
4
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 13, No. 3 [2004], Art. 5
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol13/iss3/5
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2004.1545
In-Flight Icing 
million over three years on the program, called the 
Intelligent Flight Control System. Flight tests of a "self- 
learning" version of the IFCS software are tentatively 
planned for 2003, and an upgraded version is targeted for 
evaluation on a U.S. Air Force C- 17 transport in 2005. The 
q-17 was chosen because it most closely resembles a jet 
airliner. The system is very early in its development. 
Military applications of the system are at least five years 
away. Civilian applications are at least 10 years away 
(Skeen, 2002). 
In-Flight Icing Simulation 
FENSAP-ICE is an in-flight iaing simulation 
system consisting of four modules that can calculate with 
great precision and detailed airflow, ice droplets 
impingement and ice accretion shapes, as well as estimate 
the handling qualities degradation of an iced aircraft. The 
system is literally a "Virtual Icing Research Tunnel" at an 
engineer's desk, significantly reducing the need for 
expensive wind tunnel, icing tunnel and flight-testing. Its 
modem technology allows designers to explore and venture 
safely even beyond the limits ofthe certification regulations. 
The increase in aircraft safety is considered significant. 
Many afiame and engine manufacturers, flight simulation 
companies, aircraft accident investigators and aircraft 
insurance groups have already adopted this software system. 
Both the Joint Aviation Administration (JAA) and the FAA 
have also readily accepted its results in certification (Duns, 
2002). 
The Kawasaki contract is estimated at $250 000 
and is the first contract in Japan. Fred Habashi, President of 
Newmercial Technologies International, says: "FENSAP- 
ICE has broken the sound of silence in the icing field not 
only by being the first commercially available in-flight icing 
software unprotected by national secrecy, but by also 
introducing very modem approaches to this field. We have 
had considerable success with European and American 
companies that have adopted our software over the freely 
available software from their National Laboratories, but this 
is significant as it is our first contract in Japan and it opens 
the doors to other countries barred from accessing American 
and European technology" (Duns, 2002, p. I).  
DeIcersIAnti-Icine Eaui~ment 
Anti-icing equipment is turned on before the flight 
enters icing conditions. Typically this includes carburetor 
heat, prop heat, pitot heat, fuel vent heat, and windscreen 
heat. Ice often forms on the propeller before it is visible on 
the wing. Props are treated with deicing fluid applied by 
slinger rings on the prop hub or with electrically heated 
elements on the leading edges. Ice prevention on props is 
preferable to deicing because the ice may not come off the 
blades evenly and the unbalanced prop may vibrate badly 
(Aircraft Icing, 1998) 
Deicing equipment is used after ice has built up to 
an appreciable amount. There are presently three major 
types of wing deicers: boots, weeping wing systems (fluid 
deice systems), and heated wings. For the most part, general 
aviation aircraft equipped to fly in icing conditions use boots 
and, to a lesser extent, weeping wings (Aircraft Icing, 1998). 
Boots are strips of rubber that run along the fiont edges of 
the wings and the tail surfaces. When ice adheres to those 
surfaces, the pilot flips a switch that inflates the boots with 
air. As they inflate, the boots expand and the ice breaks 
away. The technology is found on most turboprop planes. 
Although boots of various designs have been used 
successfully for decades, they are not without their flaws. 
The boot does not work equally well for ice of all 
thicknesses (Paula, 1997). 
Years ago, deicers had large, widely spaced 
inflation tubes that were slow to inflate. It was necessary to 
wait until one-quarter to one-half inch of ice built up on the 
boot prior to actuation to prevent the chance of ice bridging, 
an arch of ice formed over the top of the inflated tubes. The 
bridge could not be broken because its base remained 
suspended above the fully inflated boot. Modem deicers, 
though, have much narrower inflation tubes and 
considerably faster inflation rates. No longer is it necessary 
to wait for measurable ice accretion before actuating the 
boots. Most approved flight manuals now recommend 
actuating the boots at the first sign of ice accretion. But 
deicer use instructions vary by make and model of aircraft. 
And deicers don't protect all surfaces on the aircraft. Only a 
few critical surfaces, such as airfoil, and in some cases strut 
and leading edges are protected. Unprotected surfaces can 
still accrete ice, thereby increasing drag. For instance, 
NASA claims that some aircraft can suffer a 36 percent 
increase in drag due to icing, even though the deicers are 
functioning properly. The only ways to rid the aircraft of 
such ice accretion is to climb to cold, dry air where the ice 
can sublimate or descend into warmer air where it can melt 
(George, 2003). BFGoodrich, presently the only supplier of 
boots in the United States, has introduced a new system that 
incorporates ice detection and deicing into one package. 
Called "Smartboot," it advises the pilot when to cycle, 
confirms boot inflation, and detects any residual ice, making 
Smartboot easier to use and more effective than 
conventional boots. The sensor's principal component is a 4- 
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inchdiameter probe that protrudes about 2 inches through 
the strut on the ice detector. Inside the strut are two coils, 
one of which vibrates ultrasonically at 40,000 hertz. As ice 
builds up on the probe, the probe's vibrational frequency 
decreases. The second coil senses the change in frequency. 
At a specified frequency shift, which is related to the ice 
-+ 
mass on the probe, an output signal is generated to instruct 
the pilots to activate the deicing system. "Being able to read 
icing conditions across the 3-foot length of the deicer 
provides a whole new level of detection," said Dick 
McMuny, ice protection-systems general manager. "It's a 
great alternative to single-point ice sensors, where localized 
detection may not be sufficient" (Paula, 1997, p.75). 
The weeping wing system is a patented alcohol 
deicer system that pumps fluid from a reservoir through a 
mesh screen embedded in the leading edges of the wing and 
tail. Activated by a switch in the cockpit, the liquid flows all 
over the wing and tail surfaces, deicing as it flows (Aircraft 
Icing, 1998). 
Many aircraft are now fitted with ice detectors- 
small probes that vibrate at a specific fi-equency. When ice 
builds up on the probe, it slows the vibration, activating an 
ice alert message in the cockpit. Periodically, the probe is 
heated for a few moments, melting the ice so it can detect 
subsequent ice accretion (George, 2003). 
Jets, with more powerful engines to keep crucial 
surfaces free of ice in flight, usually have heated metal 
leading edges instead of boots and rarely have icing 
difficulties (Hedges, 1998). Furthermore, the cruising 
altitudes of these aircraft are generally well above any 
precipitation, so ice would only be a potential concern 
during takeoffs and landings (Paula, 1997). 
THEBUREAUCRACYANDDELAYS 
The FAA provides oversight for the largest, busiest 
and most complex aviation system in the world. As part of 
its mission, the FAA and its staff of 49,000 operate and 
maintain our nation's air traffic system, orchestrating the 
take-off, landing and routing of 93,000 aircraft a day. The 
FAA also regulates aviation safety and security, which 
entails standard setting for, and oversight of, commercial 
airlines, private aircraft, aircraft manufacturers and the air 
traffic system (U.S. Newswire, 2000). 
Why does it sometimes take disaster or the passage 
of years for the FAA to take significant action? It is 
embedded in the conflicted nature of the FAA. Serving two 
masters, the agency not only is charged with nurturing the 
aviation industry but also must ensure the safety ofthe flying 
public. Whenever the FAA considers changes in safety and 
equipment regulations, the agency must balance safety 
against the cost to airlines. According to records and 
interviews, the result can be delays in addressing safety 
problems and more accidents related to them. Deadly delays 
have occurred in part because a law requires the FAA to 
justify the cost of implementing proposed safety measures 
by showing that enough lives will be saved (Brazil, 1994). 
Despite recommendations from one of its own 
safety specialists, the FAA failed to require changes to a 
popular commuter aircraft a full year before one of those 
planes crashed near Detroit, killing all 29 people on board. 
The recommendations in a January 1996 internal FAA 
memo called for measures that would allow pilots flying the 
30-seat Embraer Brasilia 120 to better detect ice building up 
on the wings of their planes, known as EMB-120s (Hedges, 
1998). 
In-flight icing is the suspected cause in the Jan. 9, 
1997, crash of Comair-Delta Connection Flight 3272 near 
Detroit. Several aviation experts and the Airline Pilots 
Association, the nation's largest pilot union, contend that the 
fixes would have prevented the crash of Flight 3272. A 
Tribune examination shows the FAA did not adopt the 
recommendations until last January, two years after the 
memo and a year after the Comair crash (Hedges, 1998). 
John Dow, a FAA icing expert, wrote a memo after 
discovering a trend. There had been six previous cases 
involving the EMB-120 since 1989, all of them similar to 
the Flight 3272 accident. None resulted in a loss of life, but 
each occurred in icy rain which can adhere to the wings and 
disrupt airflow (Hedges, 1998). 
FAA and Embraer officials refused to discuss their 
actions regarding the EMB- 120. Six U.S. airlines fly a total 
of 220 EMB-120s. United Express and Comair fly the plane 
in service to O'Hare International and Midway Airports. In 
addition to Dow's recommendations, wind tunnel tests 
conducted by NASA after the Flight 3272 crash showed that 
ice can form on the underside of the EMB-120's wing, 
behind deicing devices. According to the pilots union, this 
causes drag on the wings, slowing the airplane so much that 
it cannot fly. Embraer knew about ice forming behind the 
deicers as earIy as 1980, the pilots union argues, when 
BFGoodrich Aerospace, which makes the deicing 
equipment, predicted it in a study. "ALPA believes that this 
accident was avoidable and was caused by the actions (or 
inactions) of many organizations," the union report 
contends. "There were several significant warnings during 
the history of EMB- 120 operations that should have resulted 
in proactive actions to preclude an accident" (Hedges, 
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1998). 
The crash of Flight 3272 came as the plane was 
descending at the end of a 76-minute hop from Cincinnati to 
Detroit. Pilots Dann Carlsen and Ken Reece had no 
indication that something was going wrong. Trouble began 
just after Detroit air controllers ordered the pilots to slow the 
plane and then to turn left. As the plane began to turn, it 
dramatically lost speed. "Looks like your speed indicator," 
Carlsen told his first officer with professional calm. The 
engine power was increased, but the EMB- 120's turn kept 
getting steeper, its airspeed lower. "Power," Carlsen 
commanded. The plane's bank angle reached 45 degrees, 
and then the autopilot disconnected. Suddenly, Flight 3272 
flipped onto its back. The plane swung back and forth as the 
pilots tried to regain control, but just 29 seconds after the 
first hint of trouble, Flight 3272 hurtled into the wet ground 
near Monroe, Mich. In less than a half-minute, 29 lives were 
ended (Hedges, 1998). 
Finally, Dow recommended that if pilots were not 
getting enoughwarning about ice, the EMB- 120 should have 
"a reliable means" to assess the danger of ice and to fly out 
of it. Icing experts say that would mean installation of an ice 
detector, which is one of the fixes the FAA finally adopted, 
at a cost of about $16,000 per plane. The improvement came 
after the Flight 3272 crash (Hedges, 1998). Embraer and 
FAA took additional actions after this event. Embraer 
recommended that deice boots be activated at a higher rate, 
the autopilot was to be deactivated in icing conditions until 
a low speed-alarm had been installed and they released a 
revised training video related to flight icing conditions. 
Embraer also started to improve the stall-warning computer 
icing operations (A History of Disturbing Icing Accidents, 
2003). 
A four-month Times review of government 
documents revealed that in some cases years have passed 
and lives have been lost before the FAA acted on safety 
problems although the agency had long been aware of the 
hazards. Congressional officials have suggested that the 
nation's skies would be safer and more efficient if the day- 
to-day air traffic control operations were taken away fiom 
the FAA so it can focus on airline safety issues. (Brazil, 
1994). 
CONCLUSION 
Icing was a contributing factor in at least eight fatal 
crashes and many more accidents involving U.S. commercial 
aircraft in the last decade, including the 1994 crash of an 
American Eagle ATR-72 turboprop in Roselawn, Indiana, 
that killed all 68 people on board. Government investigators 
say ice is among the possible causes of the crash of a Comair 
twin-engine turboprop that killed 29 people (Cole, 1997). 
Despite that history, most aircraft still rely on fairly 
primitive systems to monitor ice and remove it; the FAA 
literally advises pilots of commuter planes that the best way 
to detect hazardous icing is to look out of the window for 
telltale signs of buildup. New technologies are available to 
alert pilots when ice is forming and break it up more 
effectively in flight. This design relies on "smart skin" 
technology, fiber optics, specialized software and a 
computer chip no more powerful than those found in 
ordinary laptops. Genetically, it's called a stress sensor. An 
L-shaped epoxy-based patch thinner than a credit card is 
fured to the upper side of each wing where it joins the 
fuselage. The size of the patch depends on the aircraft, but 
a Boeing 747, for example, would require one extending a 
couple of feet up the fuselage and the same distance out the 
wing. The patch contains a network of hair-like fiber optic 
cables, which run through a pencil-size hole in the body of 
the plane to a cable connected to a digital-analog converter. 
The converter feeds the information to a computer, and 
special software interprets the data for the pilot, either on a 
screen or through a digitized voice alert (Budris, 1995). 
But the FAA has declined to mandate such systems, 
arguing that the technology remains largely untested. Even 
when the FAA announced a host of proposed new icing 
rules, officials focus on stepped-up training for pilots, better 
weather forecasting and more studies of how ice forms, not 
the installation of new hardware (Cole, 1997). 
A successful program to avoid icing-related 
mishaps must be approved by FAA. Two laws spell potential 
delay for installation of icing detection systems by our 
airlines. The FAA is required by law to balance safety 
against the financial burden to airlines and manufacturers 
whenever it considers changes in safety and equipment 
regulations. Cost could cause delay by adversely impacting 
the smaller airlines in a significant way. Also FAA must 
justify the cost of implementing proposed safety measures 
by showing that enough lives will be saved (Brazil, 1994). 
Even FAA's harshest critics don't believe that the 
agency knowingly waits for accidents to happen. But 
because the FAA must justify changes that require 
expenditures by the aviation industry, the agency sometimes 
must use past accidents to help build its case. And once the 
agency decides to make safety-related changes, it can take 
years before new rules take effect because the agency must 
consider the effects on the airline industry. FAA is required 
by law to justify rules changes that cause financial burdens 
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to government or private industry. Critics say that the FAA, 
in seeking changes in regulations, depends too heavily on 
accidents that have already occurred. The reason, they say, 
is that in an atmosphere of public outrage over a serious 
accident, it is easier to pass reforms through Congress. 
Before the FAA can act, the agency must calculate how a 
proposed safety rule will affect the aviation industry. The 
agency must consider everything from the public perceptions 
to the economic impact. Critics feel that sometimes safety is 
secondary to economic concerns (Brazil, 1994). 
The FAA could do more to fund airfhne ice-detection 
technologies to help pilots steer clear of dangerous icing 
encounters, says Carol Carmody, the former acting chair of 
the National Transportation Safety Board. Sensor 
manufacturers like BFGoodrich Aerospace Aircraft Sensors, 
developer of an icedetector system that Carmody said could 
be acceptable for aircraft if made smaller, may be "waiting 
for a sign from the FAA before proceeding." The agency, 
however, believes detection technologies have advanced to 
the point where no further FAA research dollars are needed. 
Said FAA spokesman Les Dorr: "The information we have 
from BFGoodrich shows the R&D is at the point where if 
they submitted [the design] to us, we could certifjl it." The 
FAA, instead, is investing in weather forecasting 
technologies that could help pilots avoid icing altogether 
(Asker, 200 1). 
Icing remains a major threat to flight safety and is a 
paramount concern to the aviation industry. Sophisticated 
"smart skin" technologies are available to alert pilots when 
ice is forming and break it up more effectively in flight. The 
cost of implementing and standardizing this technology for 
the airlines must be measured by comparing.the 30 lives lost 
in aircraft crashes due to icing annually in the United States. 
This begs the question--when is it time for action?.) 
Wayne L. Golding holds an M.S. in Counseling and Guidance from Troy State University and a B.S. in Meteorology fkom Texas 
A&M University. He retired from the Air Force in 1995 after 36 years of service, as a weather officer .He is currently an Assistant 
Professor of Applied Aviation Sciences at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. 
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